Definition
The anti-commandeering doctrine holds that Congress may not directly order states, state legislatures, or state executive officials to enact, enforce, or administer a federal regulatory scheme. The federal government can regulate individuals directly, and it can encourage state cooperation through spending conditions or preemption, but it cannot conscript the states themselves as instruments of federal policy.
The doctrine is grounded in the structure of the Constitution and in the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states powers not delegated to the federal government. The Supreme Court built the modern rule in two cases: New York v. United States in 1992, which struck down a law forcing states to take title to radioactive waste, and Printz v. United States in 1997, which struck down a federal mandate that local sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers.
Why it matters
How it works
The doctrine draws a line between commands and choices. Congress cannot say to a state, you must pass this law or your officials must enforce this rule. But Congress may regulate the same conduct itself, may offer funds on the condition that a state adopt a preferred policy, and may displace conflicting state law through preemption. In Murphy v. NCAA in 2018, the Court applied the doctrine to strike down a federal ban on states authorizing sports betting, treating a prohibition on state lawmaking the same as an affirmative command.